MANIFEST DESTINY OR CONTINUITY AGENDA: contextualising British imperial policy in the southern Caribbean before and after Vienna

DESTINO MANIFIESTO O PROGRAMA DE CONTINUIDAD: contextualizar la política imperial británica en el Caribe sur de antes y después de Viena

DESTINO MANIFESTO OU PROGRAMA DE CONTINUIDADE: contextualizando a política imperial britânica no sul do Caribe antes e depois de Viena

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Abstract: The Congress of Vienna is often discussed primarily in terms of the concerns and ambition of European nations regarding issues in Europe per se. Comparatively, primarily because of their preoccupation with the containment of Napoleonic France, the agenda of these nations with respect to the wider world has been the focus of far less and, more importantly, inadequate scholarly attention. The Caribbean remains, for example, one those areas discussed in very limited terms and treated mainly to historiographical silence. This paper attempts to part with that tradition, in an effort to place the Congress into greater historical perspective. Britain’s emergence as the most powerful and influential European nation following the Congress makes the country a prime target to such investigation. Against the background of an understanding of Britain’s imperial agenda in the wider international context, this paper explores the country’s long-standing interest in the southern Caribbean and the implications for the evolution of the Congress and the development of the British colonial empire in the West Indies.

Keywords: Congress of Vienna. Napoleonic Wars. Coalition Wars, Southern Caribbean. Circum-Caribbean. Britain’s imperial agenda.

Resumen: El Congreso de Viena se discute principalmente en términos de las preocupaciones y la ambición de las naciones europeas con respecto a los problemas en Europa per se. Comparativamente, debido a su preocupación con la contención de Francia napoleónica, la agenda de estas naciones con respecto al resto del mundo ha sido el foco insuficiente de atención académica. El Caribe sigue siendo, por ejemplo, discutido limitadamente y tratado principalmente al silencio historiográfico. Este trabajo intenta desprenderse de esa tradición, en un esfuerzo para poner el Congreso en una mayor perspectiva histórica. El surgimiento de Gran-Bretaña como la nación europea más poderosa e influyente de Europa tras el Congreso habían sido el país objetivo de esta investigación. En un contexto de comprensión de la agenda imperial de Gran-Bretaña en el contexto internacional más amplio, este documento aborda interés del país en sur del Caribe y las implicaciones para el desarrollo del Congreso y del Imperio Colonial Británico en las Indias Occidentales.


Resumo: O Congresso de Viena é muitas vezes discutido principalmente em termos de preocupações e ambições das nações europeias em relação a problemas na Europa. Comparativamente, principalmente por...
causa da preocupação do Congresso com a contenção da França Napoleônica, a agenda dessas nações em relação ao resto do mundo tem sido o foco de menos e, mais importante ainda, insuficiente atenção acadêmica. O Caribe, por exemplo, continua a ser discutido em termos muito limitados, e tratado especialmente com silêncio historiográfico. Este artigo tenta romper com essa tradição, em um esforço para colocar o Congresso em maior perspectiva histórica. O surgimento da Grã-Bretanha como a nação mais poderosa e influente da Europa após o Congresso torna o país alvo dessa investigação. No contexto de um entendimento da agenda imperial da Grã-Bretanha no contexto internacional mais amplo, este documento explora interesse de longa data do país no sul do Caribe e as implicações para a evolução do Congresso e o desenvolvimento do Império colonial britânico nas Índias Ocidentais.


The Congress of Vienna is often discussed primarily in terms of the concerns and ambitions of European nations regarding issues in Europe per se.\(^2\) Comparatively, primarily because of their preoccupation with the containment of Napoleonic France, the agenda of these nations with respect to the wider world has been the focus of far less and, more importantly, inadequate scholarly attention\(^3\). The Caribbean remains, for example, one of those areas discussed in very limited terms and treated mainly to historiographical silence. This paper attempts to part with that tradition, in an effort to place the Congress into greater historical perspective. Britain’s emergence as the most powerful and influential European nation following the Congress makes the country a prime target for such an investigation. Against the background of an understanding of Britain’s imperial agenda in the broader international context, this paper explores the country’s long-standing interest in the southern Caribbean and the nearby Spanish Main, and the implications for the evolution of the Congress and the development of the British colonial empire in the West Indies and South America.


\(^3\) There has been attempts to address the lacuna in recent times. Consult, for example, CRUZ, Maria Odileiz Sousa; HULSMAN, Lodewijk. *A brief political history of the Guianas: from Tordesillas to Vienna*. Boa Vista: Universidade Federal de Roraima, 2014.
The Congress and its aims and objectives

The conventional approach to discussion of the Congress of Vienna is to speak firstly of its objectives: Its preoccupation with peace and security in Europe, the need for prevention of future French aggression, the preservation of the legitimacy of monarchies in Europe, the development of a workable balance of power, and the need to compensate nations compromised by redistribution of a portion of their lands. All these objectives are related primarily to Europe. But the Congress operated at more than one level. In the first instance some nations were more powerful than others.4 In the second, some had interests outside of Europe which were not shared by other nations represented around the negotiation table. In the third, the Congress was a caucus for negotiation, one expected to be tempered by legitimate expectations, against the background of what existed before the Napoleonic era, but more importantly what was presumed best for the future, based on broad consensus.5

Looking at the first issue, the power brokers were not new, and would have been familiar with the domains of power and weakness constituted in each nation represented at the Congress, as well as recent and historic trends and orientations related to the issues, phenomena and problems under focus. The major power brokers, the "Pentarchie" (big five), were Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia and France.6 They were not all at the same level, as would have been indicated by developments related to the Coalition Wars from 1792 to 1815, which were aimed at ridding Europe of the problems they were attempting ultimately to settle at Vienna through diplomatic negotiations. Regarding the second consideration Britain and France differed from the rest of the big five - though not significantly from others at the conference - in that they normally possessed overseas colonies. Finally, regarding the preoccupation of the Congress with restoration of stability and order, there was obvious consciousness of territorial questions (whether in Europe or overseas), and of status of nation states in terms of what existed before Europe was ravaged by the Napoleonic Wars. The power brokers had to be prepared to make concessions. From the point of view of empire, Britain was the most formidable. Regarding

4 MARK, op. cit., p. xiii.
5 Ibid.
spiritual authority, first place was always coveted by the Central European Catholic states. Meanwhile, the nation that needed to be kept in check through pacification was France. In the West Indies, Britain and France were the most significant colonial powers, in that order. Given this, Britain could peddle several issues from a better vantage point than most. These incorporated, of course, those related to the slave trade, New World slavery, colonial possessions in the Caribbean, and further, revolutions in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Britain’s discussion, however, would not have been a monologue. Some of those European nations without colonies in the New World were still hoping for acquisition. Most Central European nations were concerned about independence movements and revolutionary upheavals in Latin America, the Caribbean and elsewhere, indeed how to prevent another Haiti. For all of this Britain, however, would have had its own focus and orientation. It is largely in relation to France, not Napoleon, regarded then by Frenchmen around the table as a menace, that Britain was prepared to make a number of concessions in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Britain was the major imperial power at the global level and its orientation to the Caribbean and its needs regarding the region, particularly security for the planter class and the strengthening of contact and trade with Latin America, would have affected the country’s choices. This paper is not much about any of these in particular, but about exploring the very broad context in which decisions would have had to be made. To this day, it would appear that historians have hardly factored in the Caribbean and South America, more particularly what is today being referred to as the Guianas, in the discussions regarding the Congress and its impact on the world. We note firstly that that among other factors, Britain’s early involvement in the Americas was significantly influenced by two developments: Walter Raleigh and his voyages and writings on the New World, in which he preoccupied himself with the search for El Dorado, the fabled City of Gold, which he believed to exist in what he termed the Guianas. Raleigh was a sycophant, a flatterer and self-seeker. But he was also a statesman, sailor and soldier, and a scientist and man of letters. Although he did eventually fall out of favor with Queen Elizabeth, and later her successor, with that latter development leading to his death by hanging he did exhibit considerable influence on the notion regarding the existence of El Dorado. Secondly, contemporaneous with Raleigh was Richard Hakluyt whose writing, thinking and activism promoted agriculture and British penetrations and settlement of the Americas, including the South American mainland. Hakluyt was one of the most influential thinkers on

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British colonial policy. But Hakluyt was influenced by Raleigh\(^8\). We also know of Raleigh’s influence on Sir Robert H. Schomburgk. It was the latter who edited Raleigh’s “The Discovery of the Large, Rich, and Beautiful Empire of Guiana, with a Relation of the Great and Golden City of Manoa” embellishing it as suggested on the cover of the rewrite with “Copious Explanatory Notes and a Biographical Memoir” written by himself\(^9\).

Perhaps, though arguably, and for reason that would become apparent, a good place to begin is with the Coalition Wars themselves, if only because they have been discussed monothetically and monolithically as an attempt to resolve only the then contemporaneous conflicts. But history often compels us to go further back. The Wars and their consequences at the Congress are among the more historiographed experiences of the modern world. Yet the role of the Caribbean in their arrival and the connection between these experiences and the Caribbean has been the subject of very little enquiry. Although Britain emerged as the most powerful post–Congress nation, neither the significance of territories of British interest in the Caribbean (and circum-Caribbean) nor the effect of the Congress on European empires in that region has attracted sufficient scholarly attention. This essay, abstracted from a larger work on the Congress of Vienna and the Caribbean is an attempt to place the relations between the Euro-powers and the West Indies into historical perspective, working through the example of Britain, its agenda in the Caribbean, the outcome of the conference and the consequences for the imperial powers and the colonized, in particular, the southern Caribbean. It posits that, apart from all that these meant in terms of developments in Europe they were a build-up to the long-standing rivalry between Britain and France. Secondly, that the Caribbean had in part been a considerable part of the basis for this rivalry, becoming in the prelude to the period of the Napoleonic Wars, what Eric Williams in *From Columbus to Castro*, described as “the Cockpit of Europe”\(^10\). Thirdly, that

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10 WILLIAMS, From Columbus…op. cit., p. 69.
patterns in the emergence, causes and consequences of the period precedent to the Congress, the era of the Napoleonic Wars (including the Coalition Wars) are not particularly different from those which preceded them in the centuries when the Caribbean was more important. Further, that Britain’s unspoken ascendancy during and after the Congress, like that of its chief rival France, had its genesis in how empire was initially conceived after fifteenth–century European contact with the Caribbean. Finally, that in the final phase of the Napoleonic Wars, and through the Congress, Britain may have crystallized the realization of its imperial ambition in the southern Caribbean with the acquisition of Trinidad, Tobago, St Lucia and today’s Guyana, as we might chose to ask ourselves what special role or significance did European colonizers attach to these territories in as much as the Euro-powers fretted and strutted so much after them.

**The Guianas**

Today’s Guyana (the term is the modern substitute for Guiana), is, geographically, part of the South American mainland. It was gestationally conceived at the Congress in 1815 out of Britain acquisition of the Demeraras, Essequibo and Berbice. As a geopolitical demarcation, it was officially birthed in 1831 when Britain unified the three riverine areas into a single colony distinctively called British Guiana. British Guiana is contiguous to and south east of Venezuela, which in the context of emerging Guiana studies is to be regarded as the Spanish Guyana. The latter is contiguous to and lies to the north west of Suriname, which in the context of present discourse on the Guianas, is rightly to be considered as Dutch Guiana. Projecting our considerations south-easterly, Suriname is followed by Cayenne, which is to be regarded as French Guiana. To the south lies Brazil, which, accordingly, is to be and was considered, Portuguese Guiana, particularly Amapá, just south of Cayenne, in which all European powers demonstrated interest. The key to an understanding of this notion lies in the term Guiana, which, for the Amerindians (the word originated with them) means “land of many waters”. The waters to which the Amerindians alluded were the Orinoco and Amazon and the many other rivers connecting them. In colonizing South America, in particular the eastern portion, the western portion with its Andean mountain chain is essentially another matter, Europe had colonized the ‘land of many waters’. Wrote Rodway,
Guiana is the name of country lying between the Rivers Orinoco and Amazon, which form the boundaries north-west and south. It was spoken of as an island from the general idea, particularly confirmed by modern exploration, that the two great boundary rivers were connected far away in the interior [...] by means of the Negro River and its branches with the Orinoco [...] 11

The conceptualization is elaborated by Cruz and Hulsman who argue that, historically, this area known as “Guiana” or “Guianas” “is part of the larger Northern Amazon region, bounded by the area formed by the Orinoco, Amazon and Negro rivers”, and that, currently, “these areas belong to the countries of Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and France (D.O.F. or French Overseas Department)” 12.

To the Amerindian the geographical boundaries and limits imposed by the Europeans meant very little geo-culturally, except for the stymieing effect and implications of the latter on their continued integration and interaction 13. But it was the Amerindians who gave the term to the Europeans and after Columbus’ voyages of discovery and conquest contending westerners fought to acquire and retain a portion of it. Based on their own experience in Europe, the Canaries, Azores and elsewhere, they had come to appreciate fully the importance of nearby islands to the colonization of continental land masses. Spanish colonization of South America, had, after all, been an extension of its colonization of the West Indian islands, in particular Trinidad. They were prepared to fight for every rock in the West Indies.

The island of Trinidad lies in very close proximity to the shared Guianas of Venezuela and Guyana (formerly British Guiana). It is the closest West Indian island to the Spanish Main. Trinidad is also close to the West Indian islands further north, beginning with Tobago with whom it now forms a unitary state (Republic of Trinidad and Tobago), Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbados and St. Lucia. In the colonial history of the Caribbean the close proximity of these islands to each other had often meant that the occupation and settlement by any European power was threatened by that of any European counterpart in any other 14. These southern islands,

primarily Trinidad, the most southerly of all the Caribbean islands, were gateways to South America, in particular, the Guianas of the Spanish Main. The Caribbean archipelago, spanning the Caribbean Sea, stretches from Aruba and Curacao in the south-west, and in the south-east from Trinidad, Tobago and other Windward Islands to Cuba and the Bahamas in the north.

**Patterns of European global conflicts**

It is not often acknowledged that European interest in the Caribbean was the critical constant in the rise of Atlantic economies from the time Columbus made landfall in the region in 1492, until the age of nineteenth-century New Imperialism engrossed the North Atlantic in the frenzied scramble for territories worldwide that culminated in World War I. Until then, and beyond that well into the late twentieth century, leading European nations conceived empire primarily in terms of the possession of colonies. It was this orientation that, in the aftermath of Europe’s accidental discovery of the so-called New World, undergirded Spain’s claim to it, the papal bulls that shared it with Portugal, and the challenge to the Iberian empires in the Americas that emerged from other leading western European nations. Thus did the establishment of contact between European and the Americas enjoin these worlds in struggles in which empires were conceived in terms of, not merely colonies, but mainly colonies in the New World. Moreover, in the ensuing rivalry for dominance in Europe, Holland, Britain and France directed their forces firstly against Spain (and Portugal) in the New World and then each other. This was the substance of the West European international relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Once the Spanish monopoly over the region was shattered, England and France turned their attention to debilitating the Dutch whose dominance of trade and commerce in the region reflected the nation’s growing global significance and threatened their prospects for the establishment and consolidation of empires in the New World and elsewhere. Britain and France’s ousting of the Dutch left them in fierce competition against each other over the one and a half centuries or more that presaged the Congress of Vienna.

The West European preoccupation with extra-European empire did not begin with the West Indies and establishment of the Spanish emporium. It was mobilized in the first instance out
of the emergence of nation-states in Europe and the attendant conflicts among them there. Accordingly, much of Europe had at least one thing in common, a desire to strengthen their position in Europe through trade and empire elsewhere, an ambition well-inculcated after Portugal’s extension of itself in Guinea and West Central Africa by 1481. Columbus’ achievement on behalf of Spain in 1492 was therefore within the mindset of European nation-states, weaker or stronger, and in that of other adventurers equal in spirit and daring to the Genoese. No sooner had news of the success of his trans-Atlantic journey hit Europe than its princes began to denounce the achievement on the basis of their prior involvement, however limited, with the Columbus enterprise. Chief among the claimants were the Portuguese, Italians, British and French. For the most part, for Portugal and Spain, the issue of legitimate entitlement to a part of the western hemisphere was to and should have been settled by Popish dictates. In truth and in fact these settled very little. The number of claimants and aspirants to a stake of Adam’s will in the New World grew to include the Danes, Sweden, the German state of Brandenburg-Prussia, Latvia and Austria. The colonizing of the Americas was not an entirely West European fixation. It was European, period.

This quest and, in consequence, the wars it inspired came to be dominated by certain nations with whom emergent states, principalities and towns acted in rare or regular concert, often shifting their alliance from time to time according to their own needs and their assessment of the likely outcome of present and future success or danger. Imperialism agendas, mercantilist predisposition, nationalistic and ethnic chauvinism, all significantly under the pretext of a surfeit of religious persuasion and humanitarian values, unleashed themselves on a widening world including all of the Americas, Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. Beginning with the West Indies, Spain’s European counterparts devoted themselves to the destruction of the Spanish monopoly, firstly through illegal trade, raids against Spanish shipping and settlements, and through the effective occupation that culminated in the establishment of French and English colonies until the

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18 Tratado que el Obispo de la Ciudad Real de Chiapas, D. Fray Bartolome de las Casa, compuso por del Consejo Real de las Indias sobre la materia de los Indios que han hecho en ellos esclavos, Seville, 1592, cited in SACO, José Antonio. Historia de la esclavitud de la Raza Africana en el Nuevo mundo y en especial en los países amélico-hispanos. t. 1. Barcelona: Impresora de J. Jepús, 1879, p. 185-186.
Congress of Vienna. These are obvious infractions against the Spanish empires in the New World, and on the West Indies in particular. Others, relevant to our understating of the region are not as obvious, as every war in the Caribbean was not about the Caribbean, in much the same way as each in Europe were not about Europe per se. Cross-directional connections existed.

Between 1618 and 1648 Spain became embroiled in the devastating Thirty Years War. The war involved much of Europe, and was rooted in the rivalry between the Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, including those of Spain and Austria, and the emerging Protestant nations of central Europe. The principal issue was the balance of power in Central Europe, part of which had to do with increasing the wealth and power of Spain, much of which had come from the New World and, by extension, the threat of the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs in Central Europe. In is amazing how the Protestant nations of the European heartland were able to call on Spain’s enemies, Protestant and Catholic alike, for help. Britain, soon to give official title, recognition, and distinctiveness to its brand of Christianity, with its nomenclature as “Anglican” (meaning England), joined the anti-Spanish alliance. So too Denmark under the Lutheran Christian IV, and Northern Holland, Europe’s first republic, which under the Calvinist, Williams of Orange, had in the preceding century jettisoned Spanish rule during the Eighty Years War. The Franco–Spanish War 1635-1659 was the escalation of conflict between France, itself Roman Catholic, and the Habsburg ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, because of the latter’s support of Spain, and France’s support of Spain’s enemies. France had become weary of being surrounded by Habsburg rulers and territories in Europe. The period between 1602 and 1663 saw the Dutch–Portuguese War. Primarily the conflict saw the unleashing of the forces of the Dutch East-India and Dutch West companies against Portuguese colonies in the Americas, Africa, India and the Far East. It was also an outgrowth of the Eighty Years' War. Portugal constituted a target of the Dutch as the former was wedded to the Spanish crown via a dynastic marriage resulting from the War of the Portuguese Succession. Britain assisted the Dutch during the war against Portugal, changing course when the latter began to

pursue nationalism against Spain. More than this after the Dutch wars with Portugal, Britain and the Dutch went to war. Four wars would characterize the relationship between them over the period from the British interregnum to the decade preceding the French Revolution. At the end of the period we find the Dutch to be a spent force, never a member of the “Pentarchie” and susceptible to the dictates of British and French interest around the negotiation table in 1815. To understand such a moment it is necessary to know something of the century which preceded it.

Eighteenth century conflicts differed from those of the seventeenth century only in terms of inevitability particularism. There was the intensification of capitalism, but that was an orientation taking form Columbus. In these sense the conflicts of the long eighteenth century, which saw the beginning of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, point to a certain measure of cyclicity in European affairs. They underscore our claim that European preoccupation with overseas empire did not emerge from its encounter with the West Indies and establishment of the Spanish sea-born empire, but with their already held perception of the nation-state as the root of empire and how it might be advanced or sustained. Within that framework, Europe had developed in embryo, as pointed out, at the dawn of the capitalist era, in which “money had become to the body politic what blood was to the human body”. If anything, contact with the New World merely expanded on notions regarding group domination, personal wealth and power, class differentiation and the conceptualization of legitimacy. What historians often miss is that to the extent that was so, there was bound to be long-standing institutional memory, socio-psychological, cultural compulsives, and resulting revolving actions and developments.

The century virtually opened with the War of Spanish Succession, a conflict-type anything but new to Europe. This time around the conflict centered on who would succeed King Phillip II of Spain who had passed on without a direct heir, but had proposed the grandson of Louis XIV as his successor. Given the size of the Spanish and French empires, the prospect of any such alliance seemed too threatening for Britain, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Dutch who determined place their successor of choice on the Spanish throne. The resulting conflict, equally an economic war, was significantly fought in Europe, as well in the Americas, including the Caribbean. The Leeward Islands, Guadeloupe, St Eustatius, Curacao and the South American mainland territory of Suriname were the scenes of significant fighting. The conclusion of the war

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23 WILLIAMS, Documents of West.. op. cit., xxxi-xxv.
saw no overwhelming geo-political change in Europe, but at the Peace of the Utrecht the French were forced to give up their part of St. Kitts to the British. Additionally, because Britain and Spain had made peace, thousands of British seamen, trained to assault Spanish and other enemies in the New World and elsewhere, were relieved of their duties and gravitated towards piracy in the Caribbean, almost elevating it to the noblest vocation in the region. Important too, as a consequence of the peace, Britain secured the *asiento* to supply enslaved Africans to the Caribbean, a development that was to significantly alter the demography of the region. As negotiations progressed, the term ‘balance of power’ was used for the first time. Overall, the influential negotiators were the French and English. Even the French, subservient to rising English power, could taunt the Dutch with the words “*bon mot de vous, chez vous, sans vous,*”, that is to say negotiations would be held “about you, in your country, without you”. The power of Britain and France to rationalize for the Dutch was already becoming evident. Similar stuff might be said of the relationship between Britain and France on the one hand and other New World colonizers such as Spain and Portugal, even as Britain and France edged towards becoming arch rivals.

The War of Jenkins’s Ear (1739 to 1748) was, for example, fought between Britain and Spain over the right of the former to receive *asiento* contracts to traffic in enslaved Africans across the Atlantic, and Spain’s right to control the trade. The parties became enmeshed, however, in another conflict, the War of Austrian Succession, a conglomeration of conflict in diverse parts of the world, essentially emerging out of the passing in 1740 of the heads of two central European powers-houses, Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor and head of the Austrian dimension of the House of Habsburg, and Frederick William 1 of Prussia. Prussia and Austria went at each other and other European powers joined the conflict, the two most powerful among them on opposite sides; Britain on the side of Austria, France on the side of Prussia. What is also of interest is that in the Caribbean the major battles related to the War of Jenkins’s Ear took place in La Guira, in north-eastern Venezuela and Portobello in Panama. The latter was repeatedly attacked by British pirates, the likes of Henry Morgan. While the British campaign in La Guira was not successful, the efforts at Portobello were.

The Seven Years War (1753-1763), viewed in some quarters as the first World War, was largely a conflict between Britain and France. Often overlooked is its connection to what has been perceived as the “Second Hundred Years’ War” of hatred between the two countries, and
which, as explanation for the psychic motivation of the British against France might be better understood through an appreciation of the a short introductory phrase commonly found in many King James’ versions of biblical text and which captions him as “King of Great Britain, France and Ireland”. Like the First Hundred Years War (1337-1453) the Second Hundred Years War (roughly from 1669 or 1715 to 1815) as indeed so many wars in Europe is and ought to be conceived as continuous war but a series of conflicts characterized by bitter, bloody rivalry. The Seven Years War itself engages us in the 1762 exploits of Admiral Rodney, Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands whose forces attacked Martinique, then virtually the commercial center and seat of government and administration in the French West Indies. Here at Martinique, the Governor and his troops capitulated. Moreover, the same expedition captured neighboring Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, La Désirade, St Lucia and Grenada. France was left only with St. Domingue. Britain did even better, ravaging Havana, the capital of Cuba, whose Spanish administration capitulated, British forces helping themselves to tremendous booty. At the Peace of Paris, Britain gained Tobago, St. Vincent, Dominica, Grenada and the Grenadines, and Canada; restored Cuba to Spain, but gained Florida. The “Baymen” were recognized in Honduras. Martinique, Guadeloupe, Marie Galante and La Désirade were restored to France. Britain, therefore, opted to take the southern islands, returning Martinique and Guadeloupe to its arch rival.25 Already the leading naval authority Britain had an eye for and perfectly logical obsession with southern and northern poles and promontories. Its preoccupation with Honduras, the Falkland Islands, India, South Africa, and the Australia-New Zealand complex prefigures.

Turning attention to the American War of Independence we find that the dimension and direction of French support for the effort derives additional meaning when commercial interests, historical venom, national pride and imperial interest are tied together. France threw all of its weight against Britain, in a war that at one point significantly altered British and its Caribbean circumstances by reclaiming for France all her West Indian colonies, together with Montserrat, Nevis and St. Kitts for good measure, leaving Britain with only Jamaica, Barbados and Antigua. That was until Rodney, “breaking the line” of the French fleet under De Grasse, near the French islands of Les Saintes off Dominica, in a manner that would evoke nostalgia in Nelson and Trafalgar, salvaged the British Empire in the Caribbean.

France’s involvement in the American War of Independence within the Caribbean theatre completely destroyed her authority in the region. Britain was able to re-acquire all her colonies but conceded in favor of France with respect to St. Lucia and Tobago, much to the protestation of Rodney who must have understood the strategic importance of these two islands. Tobago was more keenly contested than any other West Indian island, changing hands some fifteen times from one metropolitan power to another. St Lucia, after initial interest by the Spanish and the Dutch, was a source of constant conflict between the British and the French. Both Tobago and St Lucia would have, at some point in time, been declared neutral islands. This was often a sign that even when they were not wanted for their own sake, they were to be prevented from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars

Britain and France continued to exchange blows in the Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Coalition Wars 1803-1815. This last period marked the culmination of the second century-old conflict. The Caribbean had constituted no beginning to these conflicts even if, at time, it could have proven a necessary or sufficient casus belli. The existence of empires was sufficient. But the pattern of future international relations between Britain well in place by the Seven Years War, will be even more firmly set, until 1815, by the French Revolution, St. Domingue Rebellion and the Napoleonic Wars.

The French Revolution profoundly affected Europe, French society in the Caribbean, the St Domingue revolt and, through it, other West Indian communities. Some scholars speak of the French revolution as one of the great events of human history, affecting men’s ideas and conduct for decades and even up to the present as within little more than a handful of years, the old social order of Europe was cast aside. A different social order began to take shape, a Republican state was established, and internal politics and external relations assumed a character and orientation different from what held before. The Revolution itself, with the execution of monarchs, massacres and “reigns” of terror, scared Europe, courted war with France’s European counterpart, taking the fight not only internally in France but also to external enemies of the
revolution. It also exported revolution, by its breach of convention, and through what revolutionary declarations like the “Rights of Man” portended.26

In France, when the National assembly, reconstituted from the Estates General, published its Declaration of the Rights of Man, some among the whites in St. Domingue welcomed this development as opportunity to gain autonomy and jettison French control. But the enslaved masses saw in the division that ensued among the whites, an opportunity to overthrow the colonial systems, white rule and slavery, and to take control of their lives. In St. Domingue, in 1791, the Voodoo high priest, Boukman Dutty, drawing on traditional African religiosity, as Makandal had been doing before him, inspired groups of enslaved communities to revolt. The result was the most formidable and successful slave revolt in the Americas, one which saw the establishment of a black republican state. Despite the capture of Boukman and many other leaders, the African-descended masses continued to defy French, British, Spanish and even Polish (mercenary) troops. In St. Domingue the revolution orientation evoked by Makandal and Boukman continued under Toussaint, Dessalines, Christophe and Boyer. 27

Toussaint had begun his military career in the year in which the Haitian revolution began. He was in office when the Coalition Wars began. In February 1994, in France, when the French Convention voted for the abolition of slavery, Danton, one of the leaders of revolutionary France, reflected on the declaration in this way: “His comments betrayed French contempt for the English. But contempt for various types of groupings and institutions abounded in Europe and the New World. Much of Europe, including the allies on whose side Britain found itself had nothing but contempt for revolutionary France, if not France usually.

When the First Coalition War began, Napoleon had not yet begun to lead France, although already demonstrating his preference for war as a solution to diplomatic conflicts, and his genius as a military tactician. As leader of France, however, he accentuated overwhelmingly the military thrust of France, which forcibly placed Britain at the helm of the Coalition partners,
many of whom were considerably weaker than Britain or France. An understanding of all of this would help us to be able to look out for Britain’s challenges and options, and the context in which Britain maneuvered in the Caribbean primarily - or even elsewhere, and the implications for the Caribbean and ultimately for Britain and the outcome of the Congress.

In the First Coalition War (1792 to 1797) France attacked the Habsburg (Austrian dimension) monarchy, and a host of other nations jumped in on the side of Austria. The first was Prussia. Then there was also Austria itself. They were not among the strongest nation-states in Europe. Had they been, they might have had colonies in the Western hemisphere. Then “Great” Britain got involved. One of the things that France had done was to crown the Batavian Republic with Napoleon’s brother as the monarch. The Batavian Republic was the successor to the Republic of the Netherlands. The Dutch had therefore become involved. The war virtually united all of Europe against France. By 1977, France had successfully ended its conflict with all other powers, except Britain thereby ending the First Coalition. The coalition had in fact collapsed, leaving Britain alone to fight France. What were the consequences of the conflict for the West Indies? The action extended into the French colonies in the West Indies. A British fleet successfully captured Martinique, St. Lucia, and Guadeloupe, although later that year the French recovered the latter. However, issues between France and Britain remained unresolved. How these conflicts impacted the long term imperial agenda is seen in more than one West Indian territory. St Lucia, for example had been of long standing, since the Dutch first set up camp around 1600 and in 1605 when a British vessel, blown adrift while en route for Guiana, inspired settlement on the island. The island was claimed by the French in 1635. In 1639 the British made a second attempt to colonize it but this effort went pretty much the way of their first. A French contingent sent out from Martinique in 1643. Subsequently Britain forces, under Thomas Warner, named after his father the governor of St. Kitts, laid claim to the island. During the French Revolution a revolutionary tribunal was sent to Saint Lucia. In 1794, the French governor of the island declared that all slaves were free, as was the case regarding in all French colonies. Furthermore Britain had declared the abolition of the slave trade in the island in 1806, not in 1807 as is popularly believed. Similar stuff could be said about Tobago most importantly because it had changed hands often and, like St Lucia, was at one time declared a no-man’s land; a nuetral zone. A key factor was its strategic location among the most south-easterly in the Caribbean. It

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was within easy reach of Trinidad which is situated between seven and eleven miles off north-eastern Venezuela and the Orinoco, long perceived as the gateway to the Amazon. Trinidad, however, was also important for another reason, a significantly important one: it shared proximity to Venezuela with that country’s neighboring Dutch territories of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice, all three of which Britain ultimately combined into one territory and called it British Guiana. Both Trinidad and Guiana were therefore in close proximity to the legendary El Dorado, the fabled city of gold, thought by Sir Walter Raleigh to be located on the borders between Guyana and Venezuela.

After five years of war, the French Republic subdued the First Coalition in 1797, the very year in which Britain secured the capitulation of Trinidad with Britain standing out almost as always on its own against France and, and on this occasion, Spain. A Second Coalition was formed in 1798, but this too was defeated by 1801, again leaving Britain as the only opponent of the French. The Third Coalition War (1803 to 1806) resulted from dissatisfaction which continued from the Peace of Amiens. When the Coalition declared war on France after the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon was determined to invade Britain, and planned to escape initial confrontation near the English Channel and Europe, and regroup in Caribbean waters. Meanwhile, Prussian worries about growing French influence in Central Europe started another Coalition War in 1806. Coinciding with the War of the Sixth Coalition, though technically not considered part of the Napoleonic Wars, but directly influenced and driven by it, was the War of 1812. The neutral United States had declared war on Britain. The main reason was British interference with American rights to trade with France, a development reminiscent of the backdrop to the American independence struggle. France, too, had interfered, so that it was not surprising that at one point the United States contemplated declaring war on the French also. The war itself came to a standstill early in 1815, while Napoleon was exiled on Elba. The conflict had been caused by, but was not part of, the anti-Napoleon Wars. It had become merely, no credit to conscious French effort, a diversion of Britain troops and artillery away from the Napoleonic war. After the war however, African-Americans, who participated in the war on the side of Britain, were dispatched to the West Indies. The Caribbean was affected by development in

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Europe during the period leading up to the Congress of Vienna in more ways than can be mentioned here.

**Conclusion**

Even before the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the main North Atlantic powers had confronted each other through military conflicts over empire. During the late eighteenth century Europe became embroiled in the French Revolutionary Wars from 1792, with Britain subsequently leading various coalitions against France and its allies until 1815. Whatever the pretext, religion or royal succession, the main issue was really the balance of power, which, incidentally, for Britain and France, was tied to colonial interests in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Over the centuries year the main players changed but by the time of the Coalition Wars the key rivals had long been Britain and France. The West Indian islands and other New World territories remained until the end of the eighteenth century most prosperous overseas possession of the English and French. What the Wars of Spanish Succession, Jenkin’s Ear the Seven Years War do, and of course, their respective settlements, those Utrecht, Aix-la Chapelle and Paris, is to emphasis the connection between West Indians colonies and rivalry to trade. Much the same holds for the War of American Independence the French Napoleonic wars and their respectively treaties of Versailles and Vienna.\(^30\)

The Caribbean was still seen as relevant to the British agenda of dominance and control although something in the attitude of the all Euro-powers was reflected in their shift in interest to other parts of the world. For Britain, although not so much for France, who had lost so much during the preceding wars and was attempting to hold on desperately to what considerations could be extended to Paris regarding returning France to pre-war circumstances, the focus seemed to be on sustaining the planter class as representatives of empire in a vastly changing global economic scenario dominated increasingly by focus on India, Australia, the Pacific and free trade, global peace and ideological and race dominance\(^31\). Trinidad, British Guiana, St Lucia, and Tobago remained strategically important because of Britain’s aim of penetrating South America and a long-sustained interest in what turned out to be the elusive El


Dorado, the fabled city of gold. Therefore all of the above-mentioned colonies were claimed at the Congress of Vienna.\footnote{SMITH, Raymond T. *British Guiana*. London; New York, 1962.}

It would be disingenuous to consider the question of the Guianas as the single of most important issue for Britain regarding the New World of the Caribbean. There were host other related issues including the slave trade, slave rebellions, the legitimacy of white over black rule and more. Up against them through the Haitian revolt, the series of military defeats it imposed on European forces seeking to re-introduce slavery and colonial law and order there, and, just as well, the plethora of rebellions ricocheting through the Caribbean.\footnote{These developed in the aftermath of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, deposition of the king, the spread of the Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas. See HUMPHREYS, R. A.; LYNCH, John (Ed.). *The origin of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826*. New York: Knop Inc, 1965. p. 1-27.} These issues had long preoccupied Britain and France. Unlike France, however, Britain reacted rather earlier, terminating the slave trade in newly acquired territories in 1806, and not in 1807 as is commonly argued. And, in a manner reminiscent of the attempt by Spain to claim moral authority in the New World, and of the Holy Roman Empire to do the same in Europe, Britain claimed moral authority in international and human affairs in attempting to lead the world via the Concert of Europe and, more importantly, the development of a reconfigured World Order era of Pax Britannica. But all of this would have been made easier to achieve than it otherwise might have been in world where Britain could define the nature of French peace for Europe, where France had lost so much could regain it dignity, because it was important to all that it be pacified. It was, after all, a world too where western powers had long counted on Britain for their survival some of them, having long been spent forces, some of them forming no part of the Pentarchie", it “inner council” or “the eight”. In the pentarchy, Western Europe was represented rimarily by Britain and France. Some had never been privileged to be part of the fraternity. And what of its Central Europe contingent, many nation states of which, without colonies in the New World, had maintain influence through marriages and an alliance of holiness which from conception and inception had sought to safeguard themselves against France incursion. Their interest was primarily with central Europe. Accordingly, there they had mounted a challenge which some may argue often enough had to be bolstered if not bankrolled by Britain. Peace in Europe and its wider world in 1814 and 1815 was contingent on the pacification of France, which as Talleyrand
demonstrated in his disapproval of the early proceeding and procedures of the Congress, could rally the disaffected in way unfathomable.

Much was dependent on Britain that any nation. Britain wanted to ensure that France was satisfied as it felt that there would be no peace if this was not so. Austria needed France counter to Prussia. Britain needed France as check on Russia and Prussia. All need it as check Russia. Negotiations though were done on behalf of Holland. Its representative was full of British connections. More attention was paid to the question of legitimacy, the restoration of the unification of Austrian and Southern Netherlands and restoration to House of Orange to the Holland’s throne. What comes across as querulous worthy as further exploration is the ward of the Guianas under the principle of compensation. Great Britain was credit was credited with Malta, Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope and Dutch was one of the Dutch Guianas. Holland in fact possessed two Guianas. Following the Spaniards, the Dutch would have been the first Europeans to come to this part of the wild coast, the European term used to refer to the Guianas and to indicate that it was virtually no man’s land. Of note too is the fact that in 1814 the Treaty of Paris in 1814 returned to France what is today Cayenne, a department of France which had been first settled by the French 1604 was captured by Anglo-Portuguese forces in 1809. As with British Guiana which was separated from Suriname with which it was contiguous, French Cayenne was separated from Amapá contiguous as part of Portuguese Guiana. Cayenne had hitherto been fought for by the British French and Portuguese.

In retrospect, the Congress of Vienna really reflects that it had taken the British and the French just over a century to settle their claims against other powers and each other, in the New World. In this regard the case of British Guiana in the British experience is most interesting. Until 1814, some one and one half decades afterwards, there is no geopolitical British Guiana. Indeed, Britain had on the South American main no geopolitical territory that after centuries of metropolitan imperialism legitimately constituted part of its empire its empire. This was certainly not for want of ambition or desire. Manifest destiny was always part of the Euro-American concept of the New World and how they perceived they perceived it relation to themselves in relation to itself. Richard Kluger in his “Siezing Destiny: How America grew from Sea to Shining Sea, provides us with some intimation of how Britain preceded the United States in the orientation. He wrote that years after Columbus first voyage under the flag of Spain, the British monarch, Henry VII, grasping the tremendous implication of the discoveries hired and
Italian mariner, John Cabot, to undertake an expedition to win England its claim to the New World. Cabot’s expedition took him to the north, away from those territories. He touched on the Cape Breton and Nova Scotia, claiming them for Britain all lands that. He made a follow-up expedition but was never heard from again. Britain sponsored no further expedition but immersed herself in the bedevilment that Hawkins and drake unleashed on the Spanish shipping, until almost eighty six years after that Humphrey Gilbert was able to establish a settlement in Newfoundland. Britain then lay claim to North America. That same year a young cleric Richard Hayluyt, young Oxford cleric, with a passion for geography and travel had published had published his *Divers Voyages touching the Discovery of America and the Islands adjacent.* Hakluyt had been entranced by the voyages of the various Europeans but had gone a step in his thinking advancing the settlement based on the promotion of agriculture, the domestication of crops, the encouragement of farming, cognisant as he was that short of this the possession of colonies was not ensured. Had not Spain and Portugal claimed the whole New World? And what avail? Manifesting destiny more than sitting foot on a territory claiming in the name of monarch. It required planting the revenues and customs of her Majesty both outwards and inwards for increasing the maintenance and safety of the navy, and especially of great shipping which is the strength of our Realm, and for the support of all those occupations that depend upon the same. 34 Hakluyt was also devotedly religious man, committed to the spreading of the Christian virtues, the word protestant and British challenges against Spain and Portugal in the New World for all their perceived falsities and atrocities.35

For all this he found himself a great admirer of Walter Raleigh who was one of his inspiration and one whose behalf he one wrote Queen Elizabeth support of the El Dorado enterprise. The European story of the Guianas in the New World all the in beginning in the For British Guiana, it take a pronounced step forward in 1814 when Britain acquired territories of Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice. These were unified into a single colony in 1831.

Twenty seven years after the Congress of Vienna after Raleigh made his first voyage to Trinidad, abducted the Governor of island and took him to Venezuela, we are introduced to Sir Robert H.

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Schomburgk, the German-born explorer entrusted with the responsibility of surveying British Guiana and delineating the boundaries of this newly acquired territory. His delineations would become thereafter the subject of a border dispute between neighboring Venezuela and Britain, the latter as the imperial power in charge of the colony until its acquisition of independence in 1966. Only two considers need detain us. Schomburgk writing on Raleigh make rather interesting reading. He considers British colonisation to have started with Raleigh. Finally, pursuance of his cartographical responsibilities to Britain. Each was a revision of the proceeding, inveighing further into the dispute border zone. For us to note, although as time would prove, El Dorado did not at all live up to its legendary name, it was thought to and is in fact located in the disputed border zone36.